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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
Case No. 20060911-CA 
JOSE BALTARCAR ROYBAL, : 
District No. 051904214 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of DUI, 
i i 
a third degree felony. The Defendant was sentenced to formal probation for 
thirty-six months. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
WAS DEFENDANT DETAINED FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT WHEN THE OFFICER STOPPED 
HIM AS HE WAS DRIVING HIS CAR? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact should be analyzed 
under a clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of 
law should be reviewed under a correction of error standard of review. "In 
reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress, 
findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
However, in reviewing the court's conclusions of law, we apply a correction of 
error standard." State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992)(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Constitution of the United States 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Annotated 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003) - Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
? 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by Information with Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a third degree felony. (R. 1). Defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the evidence. (R. 23-24). A preliminary hearing was held on 
November 10, 2005. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 18, 2006, in 
front of the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin. (R. 38-39). The Court took the 
i 
matter under advisement. On April 20, 2006, the Court denied Defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence. (R. 58-59). Despite the fact that the state was 
ordered to prepare a findings of fact and conclusions of law, there were no 
findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared. On July 18, 2006, the 
Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty tp DUI, a third degree felony. 
(R. 68-73). He was sentenced on October 5, 2006, to thirty-six months of 
formal probation including a term of 180 days in jail. (R. 85-87). The 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on October 11, 2006. (R. 85-
87). A timely notice of appeal was filed on October 23, 2006. (R. 90-91). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 18, 2006, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin in response to the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
(R. 97). At that hearing Sergeant Ledford testified that he had received a call 
from dispatch of "some sort of domestic dispute at 3865 Quincy, that there was 
alcohol involved, that one party left the residence, that he was drinking and he 
left in a van." (R. 97/2). Sgt. Ledford further testified that he had information 
that the Defendant had driven away in the van and that he was intoxicated. (R. 
97/4). Sgt. Ledford testified that he had received a dispatch code "1055 which 
means an intoxicated driver" (R. 97/4). 
Sgt. Ledford was driving to the scene when he came across a vehicle that 
matched the description given by dispatch. (R. 97/5). He followed the vehicle 
for over a block and finally initiated his emergency lights and detained the 
Defendant. (R. 97/6). In his testimony at the preliminary hearing Sgt. Ledford 
testified that the Defendant was driving approximately 20 to 25 miles an hour 
on Patterson (speed limit 35 mph) and continued on Harrison Boulevard in 
approximately 20 to 25 mph (speed limit 40 mph). (R. 95/3). Sergeant 
Ledford observed no weaving of the vehicle, no illegal turns or other traffic 
violations. (R. 95/12). In his testimony at the evidentiary hearing Sgt. Ledford 
changed his testimony to say that the Defendant was driving at "no more than 5 
4 
miles an hour.'5 (R. 97/7). He also testified that he was aware that there had not 
been a physical fight at the residence according to the dispatch tape. (R. 97/15). 
Sergeant Ledford also testified that the primary reason for pulling over 
the Defendant's vehicle was the report from dispatch. (R. 97/18). 
On April 20, 2006, the trial court issued a ruling denying the 
Defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court listened to the tape of the 911 
call. (See Addendum B). The trial court was troubled that the dispatcher had 
told the officer that the Defendant was highly intoxicated. The trial court ruled 
that the use of the term "highly" was a mischaracterization. The trial court, 
however, found that the giving of the 1055 code was reasonable when taking 
into account the 911 call received. The trial court further found that upon 
receiving the information that the Defendant was highly intoxicated and 
driving, required Sergeant Ledford to seize the defendant independent of any 
driving pattern. The trial court further found that the defendant did not exhibit 
any driving pattern that violated the law. (R. 95/23-25). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The officer testified, and the court found, that based solely upon a 911 
call in which the dispatcher mischaracterized the level of the Defendant's 
intoxication, resulted in a situation where the arresting officer had reasonable 
suspicion to activate his overhead flashing lights and pull over the Defendant. 
Once the officer takes that step, the encounter would clearly escalate to a level 
two encounter, requiring reasonable suspicion. The 911 dispatcher is an 
employee of the police department and, as such, acts as a governmental agent. 
When the dispatch officer improperly characterized and enhanced information 
received from a citizen with unknown reliability, that mischaracterization does 
not establish reasonable suspicion allowing an officer to seize a defendant. 
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion that Defendant had committed 
any type of crime; and, therefore, according to established case law the stop 
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. Any evidence obtained after that a legal stop constitutes fruit of the 
poisonous tree and should be excluded from evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well 
as Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, provides in 
relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated." 
In the case of State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 10, 999 P.2d 7, the Court 
held: 
A car stop and investigatory detention by police of the 
car's occupants constitutes a "seizure" under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 
(Utah Ct.App.1994); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992). To surmount the Fourth Amendment's 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, a limited 
crime investigation stop must satisfy a two-part test: " 'First, the 
officer's initial stop must be justified; second, subsequent actions 
must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying the 
stop.' " Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (quoting Case, 884 P.2d at 
1276); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 
20L.Ed.2d889(1968). 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah App. 1994) this Court was 
presented with a factual situation remarkably similar to the case at bar. In that 
case an officer activated his overhead lights seizing a defendant's car based 
solely on a dispatch allegation that a crime had occurred. The court reversed 
the trial courts denial of a motion to suppress based on the grounds that there 
was never a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. In that case this Court 
stated, 
Merely providing descriptive information to an officer about 
whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there 
are no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop 
was to be made. 
Furthermore this Court held: 
n 
[T]he legality of a stop based on information imparted by another 
will depend on the sufficiency of the articulable facts known to 
the individual originating the information or bulletin 
subsequently received and acted upon by the investigating 
officer. ( State v. Case 884 P.2d 1274, * 1277-1278 (Utah 
App.,1994)) 
The official record is devoid of any written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. However, the trial court made oral findings at the 
conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress. The Court found that the 
dispatcher told the officer that the defendant was highly intoxicated. The court 
found that the term "highly" was a mischaracterization but that the dispatcher 
was nonetheless reasonable in giving the 1055 code. The court further found 
that the dispatcher had reasonable suspicion that justified the report to the 
officer to enable the initial detention as follows: 
• The dispatcher, after listening to the 911 caller, could conclude that she 
was intoxicated. 
• The 911 caller told the dispatcher that she and the defendant had been 
drinking. (R. 95/23-24) 
At the time of the stop Sergeant Ledford relied solely on the information 
gleaned from a short dispatch conversation and did not observe any traffic 
violations that would rise to the level of reasonable suspicion or add to the 
totality of circumstances. 
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Judge Baldwin incorrectly ruled that Sergeant Ledford had reasonable 
suspicion to seize the Defendant. This ruling was in error due to the fact that 
the dispatcher could not have established reasonable suspicion based upon the 
negligible information received from the 911 caller. An analysis of Utah State 
Appellate Court decisions involving what constitutes reasonable suspicion 
would clearly indicate that the information relied on by the dispatcher does not 
meet the threshold requirement of reasonable suspicion. 
In the case of State v. Valdez 68 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Utah App. Ct. 2003), 
the Court was presented with a case where the police officers were executing 
an arrest warrant on an individual. That individual requested that the officers 
allow her to go into her bedroom to put on some weather appropriate clothing. 
The officers accompanied the individual into her bedroom, at which point they 
discovered a male individual (the defendant) lying on the bed with his hands 
obscured from the officers view. The officers, in an attempt to insure their 
safety, woke the individual, discovered that he had nothing in his hand, and yet 
proceeded to request his identification. The defendant originally told the 
officers that he did not have any identification, and then, when asked, 
proceeded to give the officers a false name. Upon discovering that the false 
name and been given, the officers arrested the defendant; and in a search 
incident to arrest, discovered methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed all 
the evidence, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that suppression with a 
holding as follows: 
The trial court found, and we are not presented with a factual basis 
to disturb its finding, that nothing supported the officers' 
investigation into Valdez's identity during the detention. The trial 
court further found that no articulable facts existed to support a 
reasonable suspicion that Valdez was involved in any criminal 
activity. Therefore, Robinson's request for Valdez's identification, 
or, absent that, information concerning his identity, exceeded the 
scope of the reason justifying the initial detention and unnecessarily 
expanded its duration and scope. Thus, we conclude that the trial 
court correctly suppressed any evidence gathered from that point 
forward. (Id, at 1059) 
In the case of State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 1043, 1049 (Utah App. 2003), the 
Court reaffirmed its longstanding position that mere nervous behavior does not 
constitute "reasonable suspicion" required for a Level-two detention. In that 
case the court held: 
We have previously held that because nervous behavior, such as 
"avoidance of eye contact, is consistent with innocent as well as 
criminal behavior," such conduct "can be afforded no weight in 
determining a detaining officer's reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). We are likewise reluctant to assign any 
particular importance to nervous conduct when determining 
reasonable suspicion in the context of a Terry frisk for weapons, 
at least, as in this case, when the nervousness is unaccompanied 
by any hostile, threatening, or aggressive behavior. Although 
"an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out 
of the car pending completion of the stop, "Maryland v. Wilson, 
519 U.S. 408, 415 117 S.Ct 882, 886 (1997) it is not difficult to 
understand why such an experience would make a person 
nervous. 
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Nervous behavior would be analogous to the limited information the 
dispatcher had in the present case. The dispatcher must understand that when 
the 911 call is made regarding a domestic dispute the caller generally 
overstates rather than understates the situation. In this case the dispatcher 
knew that the caller and the Defendant had been in a verbal disagreement; 
however, it was made adequately clear that no assaultive behavior had 
occurred. The caller stated that she had been drinking; however, she gave 
absolutely no information as to how much the Defendant had been drinking. 
The relevant portions of the transcript of the 911 call are as follows: 
DISPATCHER: Okay, what's the problem. Tell me exactly what's happening. 
MS. MCCAINE: The person that's been living with me is an asshole and I 
want him the fuck out of here. 
DISPATCHER: Okay, someone has been living with you and they're being -
have they assaulted you? 
MS. MCCAINE: Just about, yes.... 
DISPATCHER: Does he have any weapon? 
MS. MCCAINE: No. 
DISPATCHER: And he hasn't assaulted you? 
MS. MCCAINE: No. 
DISPATCHER: Has he been drinking? 
MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
DISPATCHER: He has been drinking? 
MS. MCCAINE: We both have. We both have. And you might have to take 
both of I don't even give a shit, I just want him out.... (R. 096/1-2, spelling 
and grammar original) 
The fact that the officer that pulled the defendant over after having 
followed the defendant for a considerable period of time without observing any 
traffic violation should have eliminated rather than bolstered any possible 
suspicion that the defendant was driving in an intoxicated state. 
In a similar case, State v. Yazzie, 2005 UT App. 261, ^8, 116 P.3d 969 
this Court reversed a conviction of a defendant based on a fourth amendment 
violation where the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. 
In that case the officer knew the defendant and observed him driving. The 
facts that the officer believed established reasonable suspicion are as follows: 
[The officer] pulled behind Yazzie's (the defendant's) car and 
followed him for about four blocks, during which time he noted 
that Yazzie committed no moving violations. He then executed a 
traffic stop. To justify his decision to detain Yazzie, [the officer] 
testified that he made the stop because he was convinced that 
Yazzie did not have a driver license. He based his conclusion on 
his previous encounters with Yazzie—which he estimated 
amounted to ten or more—as well as Yazzie's contact with other 
officers of the BPD. [The officer] testified that the BPD had 
encountered Yazzie "well over a hundred" times in the 
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preceding twenty years, mainly for crimes that involved alcohol, 
and Yazzie had never produced a driver license on any of these 
occasions; not with Halliday, and not with any other officer of 
the BPD. (FN2). In fact, [the officer] testified that he "would 
have bet anything that [Yazzie] had no driver's license." 
In a case with a factual situation almost identical to the case at bar, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction due to a Fourth 
Amendment violation. In State v. Burciaga , 866 P.2d 1200, 1201 (N.M.App., 
1993), the Court described the facts as follows: 
Las Cruces Police Officers Thomas and Montoya were 
dispatched to the Burciaga family home in response to a call 
concerning a domestic dispute. The dispatch did not indicate that 
any crime had been committed or was being committed, nor did 
the dispatch indicate who was involved in the alleged dispute. On 
the way to the Burciaga residence, Officer Montoya noticed a 
truck on the road that he knew belonged to Defendant. Officer 
Montoya also knew that Defendant was associated with the 
Burciaga residence. It is not clear from the record whether 
Defendant lived at the house or was only related to the residents. 
The officer did not witness Defendant driving recklessly or 
suspect that he was driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. He simply notified central dispatch that he 
was going to stop Defendant to see if everything was "okay," 
while Officer Thomas continued to the Burciaga residence. 
The Court reversed the defendant's conviction based upon a Fourth 
Amendment violation with facts nearly identical to those in the case at hand. 
Although Defendant recognizes that in the present case there was an additional 
mention that the Defendant had drank an unknown amount of alcohol, there 
was the additional factor that the 911 call indicated that there had been no 
domestic violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court 
find that the trial court erred in ruling that the stop of the Defendant was a level 
one encounter. Since the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to activate 
his overhead lights and institute a level two encounter, the Defendant's 
constitutional rights were violated and the exclusionary rule requires the 
evidence be suppressed. The Defendant therefore requests this Court reverse 
the trial court and remand for a suppression of the^evidence. 
DATED this 2 / day of March 2007. 
RANDALL Wr RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South, 6 
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, yfaT^4114-0180/posfyge prepaid 
this ^ day of March 2007. 
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Attorney at Law 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEM 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V£ 
JOSE BALTARCAR ROYBAL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APR SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051904214 FS 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Date: October 5, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: PARMLEY, RICHARD A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney (s): GALE, GARY L 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 8, 1945 
Video 
Tape Number: BIO0 506 Tape Count: 9:57 
CHARGES 
1. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - 3 r d D e g r e e F e l o n y 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 0 7 / 1 9 / 2 0 0 6 G u i l t y 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is 
represented by Gary Gale, private counsel. Court proceeds with 
sentencing. 
Mr. Gale files a notice of appeal and motion to stay the 
proceedings. Court denies the motion to stay and imposes 
sentencing. 
Sentence, Judgmen t & Commitment 
l ! t U I I I I B I i ! £ l i S ( l l I I E i f i l l i ' l l ! 
JD19259957 
051904214 ROYBAL rJOSE BALTARCAR 
Page 1 
Case No: 051904214 
Date: Oct 05, 2006 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER TRIE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 18 0 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$2775 . 00 
$0 . 00 
$1285,30 
$2775.00 
$2775.00 
$0 
$1285.30 
$2775.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 18 0 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2775.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Page 2 
Case No: 052 904214 
Date: Oct 05, 2006 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department: of Adult: Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no lav;, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse 
evaluation and any treatment deemed necessary, paying all costs, as 
directed by Adult Probation & Parole. 
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs. 
Tne defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical 
testing. 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall have installed an Ignition Interlock Device on 
any vehicle owned or operated by defendant, and shall maintain the 
same for a period of three years, paying all costs. 
The defendant shall abide by a 7:00 p.m. curfew for the first 9 0 
days after release from jail. 
The defendant shall serve 18 0 days in the Weber County Jail to 
report on 10/6/06 ©3:00 a.m. 
The defendant may r>e released to the Kiesel facility for 
employment. 
The defendant shall pay $2,775 fine through Adult Probation & 
Parole. 
The defendant is advised this is a zero tolerance probation. 
The ignition interlock is to remain until 10/05/2009 
Dated this 1 j day of VJAJ^ , 20OA ' O
PARKEY R. BALDWIN 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
1 /T 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JOSE ROYBAL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 051904214 FS 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
911 DISPATCH TAPE AUGUST 8, 2005 
CAROLYN ERJCKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 ' 
801-523-1186 
c ' L^rt^ l 
1 I DISPATCH TAPE 8-28-05 
2 DISPATCHER: 911. What is the address of your emergency? 
3 MS. MCCAINE: 65 Quincy Avenue, get over here quick. 
4 DISPATCHER: What's the phone you're calling from? 
5 MS. MCCAINE: Huh? 
6 DISPATCHER: The phone number you're calling from? 
7 MS. MCCAINE: My phone. 
8 DISPATCHER: Okay, what's the phone number? 
9 MS. MCCAINE: 392-9498. 
10 DISPATCHER: Okay, what's the problem. Tell me exactly 
11 j what's happening. 
12 MS. MCCAINE: The person that's been living with me is an 
13 asshole and I want him the fuck out of here. 
14 DISPATCHER: Okay, someone has been living with you and 
15 they're being - have they assaulted you? 
16 MS. MCCAINE: Just about, yes. 
17 DISPATCHER: Who is this person to you? 
18 MS. MCCAINE: Significant other. 
19 DISPATCHER: Okay. And what's your name? 
2 0 MS. MCCAINE: Annalee McCaine. 
21 DISPATCHER: Emily? 
22 MS. MCCAINE: Annalee, A-n-n-a-1-e-e. 
23 DISPATCHER: Okay, is he still there? 
2 4 MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
25 DISPATCHER: Does he have any weapon? 
MS. MCCAINE: No. 
2 | DISPATCHER: And he hasn't assaulted you? 
3 ! MS. MCCAINE: No. • 
DISPATCHER: Has he been drinking? 
5 1 MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
6 DISPATCHER: He has been drinking? 
7 J MS. MCCAINE: We both have. We both have. And you might 
have to take both of. I don't even give a shit, I just want him 
9 out. 
10 DISPATCHER: Okay, Annalee, just calm down for me, take a 
11 couple of deep breaths. I'm going to get somebody out there. 
12 And this is a roommate? 
13 MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
14 DISPATCHER: Okay, what's his name? 
15 MS. MCCAINE: Jose. 
16 DISPATCHER: Jose? Where is he at right now? 
17 MS. MCCAINE: He's out putting stuff in his van. 
18 DISPATCHER: Is he leaving? 
19 MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
20 I DISPATCHER: What's his last name? 
21 I MS. MCCAINE: He's going to be gone before you get here. 
22 j DISPATCHER: Well, I've got the call in, okay? And I can't 
23 J - I'm getting some information to the officers. I've got the 
24 call in, okay? So you talking to me isn't going to hinder in 
25 them responding, okay? 
What's Jose's last name? 
MS. MCCAINE: Roybal. 
DISPATCHER: How do you spell that? 
MS. MCCAINE: R-o-y-b-a-1. 
DISPATCHER: How old is he? 
MS. MCCAINE: Sixty he'll be. Fifty-nine. 
DISPATCHER: Is he white, black or Hispanic? 
MS. MCCAINE: Hispanic. 
DISPATCHER: Okay, what kind of vehicle does he drive? 
MS. MCCAINE: A van. 
DISPATCHER-. What kind of ^an. 
MS. MCCAINE: - white van, 1985. 
DISPATCHER: Do you have a plate number on the vehicle? 
MS. MCCAINE: 8 85 something. 
DISPATCHER: Is he still in the driveway? 
MS. MCCAINE: No, he's pulling out right now. 
DISPATCHER: Okay, where is he heading? 
MS. MCCAINE: I have no idea. He's heading south. 
DISPATCHER: South on what street? 
MS. MCCAINE: Quincy, 38th and Quincy, 38 - my house. 
DISPATCHER: So he's leaving on Quincy Avenue? 
MS. MCCAINE: Yes. 
DISPATCHER: And it was a white van. Do you know the make 
of it? 
MS. MCCAINE: GMC. 
3 
1 DISPATCHER: And the partial plate was 855? 
2 I MS. MCCAINE: 8 83. 
3 J DISPATCHER: How long ago did he leave? 
4 | MS. MCCAINE: About 30 seconds. 
5 DISPATCHER: And this is the person that lives with you? 
6 | MS. MCCAINE: Yes, he has been. 
7 i DISPATCHER: Okay, I'm going to have an officer get out 
8 I there as soon as I can, okay? If he responds back, you give us 
9 a call and let us know, okay, if he returns. 
10 MS. MCCAINE: Thank you. 
11 | DISPATCHER: Okay, bye-bye. 
12 J (End of CD recording! 
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1 CERTIFICATE 
2 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript 
3 I of the 911 dispatch CD provided by Mr. Gary L. Gale was 
transcribed by me from a CD recording and is a full, true, a 
5 I correct transcription of the proceedings as set forth m the 
6 J preceding pages to the best of my ability. 
7 | Signed this 14*"1" day of February, 2006 m Sandy, 
Utah. 
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11 ( Carolyn Erickson, CSR 
12 My Commissions expires May 4, 2006 
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